Banks, payments, and card issuers

The fraud desk and the SOC are still briefing different campaigns.

Banks do not lack alerts. They lack a platform that binds a criminal actor to the payments host, the wire desk, and the vulnerability an access broker already listed. Attack Nemesis is that platform — analysts still sign the call.

What we hear

  • BEC and mule infrastructure that never get bound to an endpoint or a CVE
  • Fraud, CTI, and vulnerability teams working three queues for one campaign
  • Feeds that name malware families and never name a card-issuing host

On the platform

Attack Nemesis · Payments picture

Fraud desk and SOC

  • Help-desk BEC against a payments processor

    AN-4401

    Wire desk

    Unsigned

  • Fraud-mule hosts on a card-issuing segment

    AN-4362

    Payments

    Bound to XDR

  • Core-adjacent VPN in an access-broker listing

    AN-4351

    Remote access

    Ticket drafted

Banking — one campaign across the fraud desk and the SOC.

What changes

One picture for fraud, CTI, and the vulnerability queue

Actor-bound priority on payments, identity, and remote access

Tickets and detections pushed to the SIEM and ITSM the bank already runs

Questions

Common questions

How does Attack Nemesis help banks and payment companies?
Fraud, CTI, and vulnerability teams work one picture instead of three queues for one campaign. Criminal actors bind to payments hosts, the wire desk, and the vulnerability an access broker already listed. Attack Nemesis gets the fraud desk and the SOC briefing the same campaign.
What does Attack Nemesis bind together for a bank?
BEC and mule infrastructure, criminal actors, endpoints, CVEs, and the payments, identity, and remote-access systems they target, including card-issuing hosts. Priority follows the actor, not the feed volume. Attack Nemesis binds criminal actors to the systems money moves through.
Can Attack Nemesis help detect FIN7-style campaigns when the malware changes?
Yes. Attack Nemesis Research recommends naming detections after behavior, such as a help-desk session hijacked into a payout-account change, not after the last loader, and published an action pack for processors built that way. Attack Nemesis detects the business model, not the hash.
Where do Attack Nemesis tickets go in a bank?
To the SIEM and ITSM the bank already runs, with detections alongside, after an analyst signs the call. Nothing new for the SOC to monitor. Attack Nemesis pushes tickets into the bank’s existing stack, and analysts still sign the call.

Next step

A briefing built around banking.

A forty-minute briefing: your sources, your stack, and the tickets that should already exist.